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ARTICLE
SECOND AMENDMENT:
RULED BY LAW OR BY JUDGES?
Herbert W. Titus, J.D.t
[T]here is no new thing under the sun. Is there any thing whereof
it may be said, See this is new? It hath been already of old time,
which was before us.
Ecclesiastes 1:9(b)-10.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is conventional wisdom in twenty-first-century America that
ultimately law emanates from the bosoms of men and women on the bench.
Law is, we are told, whatever the judges say it is. Or as Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes is reported to have said: "We are under a Constitution, but
the Constitution is what the judges say it is."'
It is also assumed that, because we separate church and state in America,
the Bible has no place in a courtroom, much less a law school classroom.
Nicholas Von Hoffman, a nationally-syndicated columnist, responded to
the news in 1981 that the American Bar Association had accredited a
Christian law school at Oral Roberts University by stating:
[I]n America we don't have Christian law, Jewish law, Moslem
law. We only have law-law. Is a law school that winds its
professional training inextricably in with religious doctrine even
attempting to turn out attorneys ethically prepared to practice in
a non-theocratic, secular court system?2
t B.S., University of Oregon, 1959 (Phi Beta Kappa); J.D., Harvard University, cum
laude. Of Counsel, William J. Olson, P.C., Vienna, Virginia. Member, Virginia State Bar.
While the views expressed in this article are my own, they have been greatly influenced and
sharpened by my colleagues William Olson, Robert Olson, and other members of the firm,
through the joint authorship of several amicus briefs addressing various Second Amendment
and firearms issues submitted to several courts. Copyright @ 2014 Herbert W. Titus; LIBERTY
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW. All rights reserved.
1. Harry W. Jones, Law and the Idea of Mankind, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 753, 766 (1962)
("We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and the
judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty and of our property under the Constitution.").
2. N. Von Hoffman, For WASPs Only, ADIRONDACK DAILY ENTERPRISE, August 26,
1981, at 4.
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Both of these views-that judges make law and that American law is
entirely secular-are of recent origin. Before the advent of the twentieth
century, legal scholars agreed with Sir William Blackstone that judges, like
Moses in Exodus 18:16, only "found" the law and "declared" it.' The notion
that judges are the sources of law was totally foreign to men like George
Mason and James Madison and their fellow Virginians who subscribed their
names to Section 16 of the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights, which
defines "religion" as "the duty which we owe to our Creator, [enforceable]
only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence."' They, like
Blackstone before them, believed that all of law originated from God who
had created the heavens and the earth.s Indeed, it was upon this very
foundation from the book of Genesis that Thomas Jefferson relied when he
penned these words to the preamble to his 1786 statute establishing
religious freedom in Virginia:
Well aware that ... Almighty God hath created the mind free,
and manifested his Supreme will that free it shall remain, by
making it altogether unsusceptible of restraint: That all attempts
to influence it by temporal punishments ... are a departure from
the plan of the holy author of our religion, who being Lord both
of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on
either, as was in his Almighty power to do, but to extend it by its
influence on reason alone[.]"
The Founders understood that the first freedom of the First Amendment
could not be rightly discovered and applied apart from the Bible teaching
on the duties that are owed exclusively to the Creator, which alone are
enforceable only by reason and conviction.! Likewise, the Second
3. See Herbert W. Titus, Moses, Blackstone and the Law of the Land, 1 CHRISTIAN LEG.
Soc'Y. Q. 5 (1980).
4. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16, available at www.archives.gov/exhibits/
charters/VirginiaDeclarationofRights.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
5. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *38-43.
6. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (June 12, 1779),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 77 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
7. See Herbert W. Titus, The Free Exercise Clause: Past, Present and Future, 6 REGENT
UNIv. L. REv. 7, 10-15, 52-56 (1995). See also Herbert W. Titus, No Taxation or
Subsidization: Two Indispensable Principles of Freedom of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REv. 505,
516-20 (1991-92); Herbert W. Titus, Education, Caesar's or God's: A Constitutional Question
ofJurisdiction, J. OF CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 101, 153-61 (1982).
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Amendment securing to the people the right to keep and bear arms can
neither be rightly understood nor applied without understanding the
Scriptural truth governing the duties owed by civil rulers to their
constituents, and the rights of the people to hold those rulers accountable to
the rule of law.
II. BIBLICAL ORIGINS
A. The People's Limited Right to Change Their Civil Government
The first book of Samuel, chapter eight, records the inspired prophet's
account of the beginning of the Israeli constitutional monarchy. Israel's
elders had come to the end of their patience with the system of government
established when Moses led the nation out of Egypt. Gathered together, the
elders submitted their complaint and their plea to Samuel: "Thy sons walk
not in thy ways; now make us a king to judge us like all the nations."8
Displeased, Samuel prayed and the Lord answered, commanding Samuel
to listen to the people, but to know this: " [T] hey have not rejected thee, but
they have rejected me."" Nevertheless, God told Samuel to "heed" the
people's request but, before doing so, to warn them that the king they were
seeking would be far worse than those about whom they were
complaining."o Unpersuaded, the elders persisted, imploring Samuel to give
them a king.
God gave Israel a king, but not the totalitarian ruler that they had blindly
sought. Rather, in fulfillment of a promise given to the people of Israel in
the time of Moses, God gave them a covenant king-a constitutional
monarchy. Note this remarkable prophecy given to Moses, as recorded in
chapter 17 of the book of Deuteronomy, approximately 440 years before the
Israeli elders submitted their complaint:
When thou art come unto the land which the LORD thy God
giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt dwell therein, and shalt
say, I will set a king over me, like as all the nations that are about
me; Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the
LORD thy God shall choose .... And it shall be, when he sitteth
upon the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of
8. 1 Samuel 8:5.
9. 1 Samuel 8:7.
10. 1 Samuel 8:9-18.
11. 1 Samuel 8:22.
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this law in a book .... And it shall be with him, and he shall read
therein ... that he may learn to fear the LORD his God, to keep all
the words of this law and these statutes, to do them . .. to the end
that he may prolong his days in his kingdom ... .12
And so, after God chose Saul to be king and after the people ratified that
choice, declaring Saul as their king," the prophecy was fulfilled when
"Samuel told the people the manner of the kingdom, and wrote it in a
book."" This word-"manner"-is from the Hebrew word mishpat, which
is variously translated as "judgment" or "ordinances," and which denotes
legal procedure, rights, and privileges." Mishpat thus included the laws
governing the power of the kingship-or the rights and duties of the
kingship. In modern terms, the document composed by Samuel would be
called the written constitution of the realm.
B. Civil Government: Ruled by Law, Not by Men
Early in the reign of King Saul, both the king and the chief judge, Samuel,
would be tested by God to see if the new government would be one of law
or one of men. The story is recounted in I Samuel 13. King Saul assembled
an army of 3,000, neither well-armed nor well-trained.'6 Indeed, the people
of Israel had been disarmed by their enemies, the Philistines having denied
them access to "[black]smiths... [1]est the Hebrews make them swords or
spears."" Thus, the Israelites resorted to their farm implements, each one
sharpening his "[plow]share," "coulter" (hoe), "axe" and "mattock" (pick)
into a weapon.' In contrast, the enemy Philistines, in assembled array
against Israel, possessed 30,000 chariots, 6,000 horsemen, and people as
numerous as sand on the seashore." So formidable were their foes that King
Saul's rag-tag band of ill-equipped Israelites went into hiding-in caves, in
12. Deuteronomy 17:14-15, 18-20.
13. 1 Samuel 10:24
14. 1 Samuel 10:25.
15. BROWN, DRIVER, BRIGGS AND GESENIUs, KJV OLD TESTAMENT HEBREW LEXICON,
Mishapat (online version) available at http://www.biblestudytools.com/lexicons/hebrew/
kjv/mishpat.html.
16. 1 Samuel 13:2.
17. 1 Samuel 13:19.
18. 1 Samuel 13:20.
19. 1 Samuel 13:5.
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thickets, in rocks, in high places, and in pits. 20 Others hightailed it over the
Jordan River, while those who remained "followed [Saul] trembling" in
their boots. 21
King Saul's only hope was for God's intervention, but according to the
manner of the kingdom-under his limited powers as king-Saul was not
authorized to offer sacrifices invoking God's mercy on behalf of the nation.
That task had been assigned to the priests-in this case to the
priest/prophet Samuel. As restated later in II Chronicles 19:11, the
constitution governing ancient Israel separated the jurisdictions of the
church and the state.22 As recorded during the reign of the godly king
Jehoshaphat, "Amariah the chief priest is over you in all matters of the
LORD; and Zebediah the son of Ishmael, the ruler of the house of Judah, for
all the king's matters."2 3 And, even later, the separation of jurisdiction was
applied to King Uzziah, who lost his kingship when he burned incense upon
the altar, a duty reserved to the priests.2 So it was that Uzziah lost his right
to rule, his son Jotham reigning in his stead.25
However, it all began with the first king, Saul, who wrongfully assumed
the priest's role to make the sacrificial offerings before going into battle
against the enemy. In accordance with the written law of the kingdom, Saul
had awaited Samuel's set time of arrival.26 But Samuel "came not" at the
appointed time.27 And things went from bad to worse. In addition to the
troops in hiding, many more of King Saul's troops scattered." Pressed by an
overwhelming enemy force and his own weakening army, the fearful king
offered the sacrifice to God.29 And "as soon as he had [finished]," who
should show up, but Samuel.30 And as King Saul went to meet and to greet
him, Samuel demanded to know: "What hast thou done?"" And Saul
earnestly explained: "Because I saw that the people were scattered from me,
20. 1 Samuel 13:6.
21. 1 Samuel 13:7.
22. 2 Chronicles 19:11.
23. Id.
24. 2 Chronicles 26:16-21.
25. 2 Chronicles 26:21.
26. 1 Samuel 13:8.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 1 Samuel 13:9.
30. 1 Samuel 13:10.
31. 1 Samuel 13:10-11.
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and that thou camest not within the days appointed, and that the Philistines
[were] gathered [against them] ... I forced myself therefore, and offered a
burnt offering."3 2
C. No Exceptions: No Matter How Compelling
Saul's argument that he was justified in doing what he was not
authorized by the nation's constitution to do, should be familiar to any
American law student who has taken a course in American constitutional
law. Saul's plea was identical to those made by government lawyers today
who persistently argue in American courts the doctrine of necessity-that
the government has an important, indeed a compelling, interest that
justifies its actions that would otherwise be contrary to the written law of
the United States Constitution. After all, what could be more reasonable-
indeed, what could be more compelling-than Saul's appeal to national
security in wartime? And what better circumstances could there be to prove
that Saul's choice was the "least restrictive alternative" taken only after
Samuel did not show up in time?
As familiar as Saul's argument would be to today's lawyers and judges,
Samuel's judicial response is almost totally foreign. Instead of asking
whether to apply strict scrutiny to Saul's action, or the lesser standards of
intermediate scrutiny or rational basis to determine how weighty the
government interest must be-compelling if strict scrutiny applies,
reasonable if intermediate scrutiny applies, or just plain old rationality-
Judge Samuel simply ruled:
Thou hast done foolishly: thou hast not kept the commandment
of the LORD thy God, which he commanded thee: for now would
the LORD have established thy kingdom upon Israel for ever. But
33now thy kingdom shall not continue ....
Saul chose not to obey God's limits upon his power as king, as written in the
nation's covenant. But Samuel, as Moses had done before him, obeyed the
limit placed upon his judicial power to say what the law is, not
manipulating the law to affirm an act that appeared justified by the
circumstances.
In so ruling, Judge Samuel was simply following the precedent
established by Moses that prescribes the province and duty of the judiciary
32. 1 Samuel 13:11-12.
33. 1 Samuel 13:13-14.
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to "make [ know[n] the statutes of God, and His laws."3 After all, it was
not within the power of either Samuel, as judge, nor Saul as king, to change
the paramount law of the kingdom, but only in the People who had ratified
the written covenant when they accepted Saul as their king.35 If there were
to be a change of the law to accommodate the interests of national security,
or some other compelling or important government interest, then the
change had to come from a source other than the judiciary-the People. 6
D. No Exceptions: No Matter How Popular
Yet even the people could not just presumptuously change the covenant
binding the king. King Saul would learn that lesson later, after his victory
over the Amalekites.3 ' Although required by God's law of national
judgment to kill all of the Amalakites and their livestock, King Saul spared
the best of the sheep and the life of the Amalekite king.38 "The people"
rationalized the king and took some of the spoil for a sacrifice to God, only
to be rebuffed by Samuel with the rebuke that "to obey is better than
sacrifice."3 ' Even the people were bound by God's law in the formation of
their government, and could not change that form of government-except
for good cause. And, thus, Samuel could not exercise judicial restraint
without abusing his duty to say what the law is.
III. THE BIBLICAL PRINCIPLES
A. The People: The Civil Sovereigns
One might ask what this lesson of Saul, Samuel, and the people of Israel
has to do with the American people, the Congress, and the Supreme Court
Justices under the United States Constitution of 1787-the answer: plenty.
According to a provocative new study by Harvard Professor Eric Nelson, I
Samuel 8 and Deuteronomy 17 transformed European political thought."
Professor Nelson documents that Seventeenth-century Biblical theology
marked the beginning point of the West's commitment to the republican
34. Exodus 18:16.
35. See 1 Samuel 10:24-25.
36. Accord Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).
37. See 1 Samuel 15.
38. 1 Samuel 15:9.
39. 1 Samuel 15:15, 21-22.
40. See ERIC NELSON, THE HEBREW REPUBLIC 26-28 (2010).
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form of government." In this book, Professor Nelson recounts that it was
England's John Milton who led the way, establishing that:
God's remarks in Deuteronomy ... were simply meant to underscore
that
[T]he right of choosing, yea of changing their own Government
is by the grant of God himself in the People. And therefore when
they desir'd a King, though then under another form of
government, and thir changing displeas'd him, yet he that was
himself was their King, and rejected by them, would not be a
hindrance to what they intended, furder than by perswasion, but
that they might doe therein as they saw good, ISam. 8 onely he
reserv'd to himself the nomination of who should reigne over
them.42
From this premise of popular civil sovereignty in the nation of Israel,
Milton inferred that "Israel is not a unique case," but served as a prototype
for all nations, God having given "all peoples the right to choose their form
of government." But Milton pressed on, asking the question whether it
was wrong for the people of Israel to have asked for a "king at all," in light
of the failures of the Israeli monarchy and Christ's warning to his disciples
that the kings of the gentiles exercise lordship over them."
B. The People's Right to Use Force to Change Civil Government
Although God relinquished his kingship of Israel voluntarily, and
centuries later, King James II voluntarily abdicated the English throne to
William and Mary, the 18th Century King George III was not so
accommodating. Thus, the issue of whether the people could change their
form of government by force of arms came to the foreground. One year
before the Declaration of Independence, on July 6, 1775, the Congress of the
United Colonies issued their Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of
Taking up Arms, declaring that "[t]he legislature of Great-Britain ... have
at length ... attempted to effect their cruel and impolitic purpose of
enslaving these colonies by violence, and have thereby rendered it necessary
41. Id. at 23.
42. Id. at 37-38 (quoting HUGo GROTIUS, DE REPUBLICA EMENDANDA 101 (Aurthur
Eyffinger ed., 1984)).
43. Id. at 38-39.
44. Id. at 39-45.
[Vol. 8:577584
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for us to close with their last appeal from reason to arms."" In support of
this claim, the representatives of the united colonies recounted the royal
governor's seizure of arms from the people of Boston "in open violation of
honour, in defiance of the obligation of treaties, which even savage nations
esteemed sacred."4 6 Pronouncing their resolve to fight for their freedoms
they declared:
Our cause is just. Our union is perfect. Our internal resources are
great .... We gratefully acknowledge, as signal instances of the
Divine favour towards us, that his Providence would not permit
us to be called into this severe controversy, until we were grown
up to our present strength ... possessed of the means of
defending ourselves. With hearts fortified ... we most solemnly,
before God and the world, declare, that, exerting the utmost
energy of those powers, which our beneficent Creator hath
graciously bestowed upon us, the arms we have been compelled
by our enemies to assume, we will, in defiance of every hazard,
with unabating firmness and perseverence, employ for the
preservation of our liberties; being with one mind resolved to die
freemen rather than to live slaves."
One year later, America's founders took the next step, issuing the
Declaration of Independence and declaring that according to "the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God":
[A]ll men are created equal, ... [and] are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights .... That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed, -That whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute
new Government .... [W]hen a long train of abuses and
usurpations ... evinces a design to reduce them under absolute
Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such
Government ... .8
45. DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING Up ARMs (1775) reprinted in
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 295 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., revised ed. 1978).
46. Id. at 298.
47. Id. at 299.
48. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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One hundred twenty-seven years before these words were penned in
Philadelphia, the English people had used the force of arms to depose the
tyrannical King Charles I, putting him to death for having breached his
covenant to rule the people according to law. English barrister, Geoffrey
Robertson-himself a leading human rights lawyer and a U.N. war crimes
judge-has recounted Puritan John Cooke's words in justification of this
action, as they appear in the official annals of the English state trials:
When any man is entrusted with the sword for the protection
and preservation of the people, if this man shall employ to their
destruction that which was put into his hand for their safety,
then by the law of that land he becomes an enemy to that people
and deserves the most exemplary and severe punishment. This
law-if the King become a tyrant he shall die for it-is the law of
nature and the law of God written in the fleshly tablets of men's
hearts.49
C. The Second Amendment: A Revolutionary Birthright
Well understood as the doctrine of the lower civil magistrate, the
American colonial representatives of the people acted not only to throw off
the tyrant, George III,so but to restore the rule of law by constituting new
governments, beginning with the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776 and
ending with the Constitution of New Hampshire of 1784. In six of the
original States-Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire-the constitutions not only affirmed the people's right
to reform, alter, or abolish even these new governments should they fail to
secure their lives, liberties, and properties, but also gave the people the means
by which to do so." The 1776 Virginia charter led the way, declaring that "all
49. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, THE TYRANNICIDE BRIEF 192 (2005) (quoting STATE TRIALS
1025).
50. See DOUGLAS F. KELLY, THE EMERGENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE MODERN WORLD 133
(1992).
51. See, VA. CONST., Bill of Rights § 3, 13 (1776) reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES,
supra note 45, at 311-12; PENN. CONST., Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the
Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, art. V, XIII (1776) reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES, supra note 45, at 329-30; Delaware Declaration of Rights §§ 5, 18 (1776) reprinted
in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 45, at 338-39; MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights,
art. IV (1776) reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 45, at 347; DECLARATION OF
THE RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, art. VII, XVII
(1780) reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 45, at 375-76; CONSTITUTION OF
[Vol. 8:577586
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power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that
magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to
them,"S2 and that "a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free
State."53 Four additional States-New York, New Jersey, Georgia and South
Carolina-included that right in preambles patterned after the Declaration of
Independence.' North Carolina's Constitution was preceded by its own
Mecklenburgh Declaration." Only Connecticut and Rhode Island were silent,
preferring governance under their colonial charters.
With such a constitutional legacy already in place, the preamble of the
1787 Constitution of the United States begins:
We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare,
and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
And four years later, this new federal government would be capped by a Bill
of Rights, the second article of which provides: "A well regulated militia
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed."5 7
As Justice Antonin Scalia explained in District of Columbia v. Heller:
[O]nce one knows the history that the founding generation knew
... [t]hat history showed that the way tyrants had eliminated a
militia consisting of all the able-bodied men was not by banning
the militia but simply by taking away the people's arms, enabling
a select militia or standing army to suppress political opponents.
NEw HAMPSHIRE, art. X, XXIV (1784) reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 45,
at 383, 385.
52. CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA (1776) reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra
note 45, at 311.
53. Id. at 312.
54. N.Y. CONsT. pmbl (1777); N.J. CoNsT. pmbl (1776); GA. CONST. pmbl (1777); S.C.
CONST. pmbl (1776).
55. The Mecklenburgh Resolutions (1775) available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18thcentury/ncO6.asp.
56. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (1787).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. II. (1791).
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This is what had occurred in England that prompted codification
of the right to have arms in the English Bill of Rights."
The Heller majority rejected the claim that the Second Amendment secured
to the States, not to the People, the authority to form a militia, by securing
to the People, not the States, the necessary means-the right to keep and
bear arms. By conforming its opinion to the written text of the Second
Amendment, the Court employed the venerable rule of construction that
"[i]n expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must
have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole
instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added.""
Thus, after quoting the entire text of the Amendment, Justice Scalia
parsed first the words of the "operative clause," beginning with the "right of
the people" and ending with "to keep and bear arms," before addressing the
"prefatory clause," beginning with the words "well-regulated militia" and
ending with the "security of a free state."o6 "[G]uided by the principle that
'[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words
and phrases ... used in their normal and ordinary ... meaning,"' Justice
Scalia concluded that the ultimate purpose of the Second Amendment was
to ensure a people "trained in arms [the] better able to resist tyranny."62
D. The Second Amendment: Judicial Nullification
The four dissenting justices read the Second Amendment text differently,
claiming that it was designed to protect the individual right to keep and
bear arms for State militia purposes, not for self-defense "detached from
any militia-related objective."63 The dissenters also objected to the majority
position that if a person was within the protected class of the "people" and if
the firearm at issue was within the protected class of "arms," then the right
to keep and bear that arm was "absolute."' Instead, as Justice Breyer
painstakingly argued, the right to keep and bear arms would not be
"infringed" by any law, unless it could be shown that the burden placed
upon that right by a particular regulation was "unreasonable or
58. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008).
59. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Peters) 540, 570-71 (1840).
60. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
61. Id. at 576 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
62. Id. at 598.
63. Id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
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inappropriate."" According to Justice Breyer and his dissenting colleagues,
the D.C. "regulation, which focuses upon the presence of handguns in high-
crime urban areas, represents a permissible legislative response to a serious,
indeed life-threatening, problem"' because:
[A] legislature could reasonably conclude that the law will
advance goals of great public importance, namely, saving lives,
preventing injury, and reducing crime. The law is tailored to the
urban crime problem in that it is local in scope and thus affects
only a geographic area both limited in size and entirely urban;
the law concerns handguns, which are specially linked to urban
gun deaths and injuries, and which are the overwhelmingly
favorite weapon of armed criminals; and at the same time, the
law imposes a burden upon gun owners that seems
proportionately no greater than restrictions in existence at the
time the Second Amendment was adopted."
Remarkably, Justice Breyer's reasoning resonates with that of King Saul
standing before Judge Samuel." After acknowledging that his "burnt
offering" was forbidden by law, Saul made out a case that it was perfectly
reasonable and appropriate for him to have substituted himself for Samuel.
After all, his army was scattering and the Philistines were upon him, and
Samuel was late. Surely Saul had not only good reason but, a compelling
one, to invoke the power of God and ensure victory over the Philistines.
Further, as Saul pled, it was out of necessity that he made the offering to the
end that many lives would be saved, injuries prevented, and the very nation
itself saved from annihilation.
IV. RULED BY LAW OR RULED BY MEN
A. The Right of the People, Not the Discretion ofJudges
Unlike Justice Breyer's response to the District of Columbia City
Council, however, Judge Samuel refused even to entertain Saul's claim that
his response to Samuel's late arrival was reasonable or appropriate.69
65. Id.
66. Id. at 681-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 682.
68. See supra Part II.C.
69. See supra Part II.C.
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Instead, Judge Samuel pronounced judgment against the king for having
acted "foolishly," having broken the written commandment of God.70 And,
like Judge Samuel, Justice Scalia, for the Heller majority, refused to entertain
the District of Columbia's plea that it had good reason for its handgun ban:
After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments for and against
gun control, Justice BREYER arrives at his interest-balanced
answer: because handgun violence is a problem, because the law
is limited to an urban area, and because there were somewhat
similar restrictions in the founding period (a false proposition
that we have already discussed), the interest-balancing inquiry
results in the constitutionality of the handgun ban. QED."
In this telling rejection of the Heller dissenters' "interest balancing'
approach," Justice Scalia asserted that:
The very enumeration of the right [to keep and bear arms] takes
out of hands of government - even the Third Branch of
Government - the power to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional
guarantee subject to future judges' assessments of its usefulness is
no constitutional guarantee at all.72
Indeed, such judicial reassessments are completely inconsistent with the
Court's own doctrine of judicial review as first articulated by Chief Justice
John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.7
B. The Role ofJudges: Limited by Law
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall reaffirmed the first principle upon
which the nation was founded. Harkening back to the nation's charter, the
Declaration of Independence, and the Preamble to the United States
Constitution, he wrote:
[T]he people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most
70. 1 Samuel 13:13-14.
71. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
72. Id.
73. See generally, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole
American fabric has been erected."
In Heller, Justice Scalia wrote:
Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were
understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or
not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that
scope too broad ... [Thus,] [t]he Second Amendment ... is the
very product of an interest-balancing by the people[.]""
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall declared that because "[tihe
principles ... so established, are deemed fundamental.... [and] designed to
be permanent," they are put in writing so as they will "not be mistaken, or
forgotten," to the end that, as written, they "form[] the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation."16 Thus, as written, the Constitution is "a rule
for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature."" In keeping with
this principle, Justice Scalia embarked upon a lengthy discussion of the
precise text of the Second Amendment to the end that the Court, in the
exercise of its judicial power and duty might "say what the law is,"78 that is,
the law as stated in the text." To be sure, Justice Scalia addressed other
texts, and historic contexts, including prior Court precedents, but only as
they appeared to reinforce the Court's "adoption of the original
understanding of the Second Amendment."" And whatever limitations
there may be on the scope of the protection afforded by the Amendment,
Justice Scalia opined that they would be found within the text, not in any
judicially-invented standard of review divorced from that text."
C. The Lawless Doctrine ofJudicial Restraint
In Heller, both Government merits briefs-one filed by the District of
Columbia and the other by the United States-urged the Court to resolve
the constitutionality of the D.C. handgun ban under one or another familiar
74. Id. at 176.
75. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35.
76. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-77.
77. Id. at 179-80.
78. Id. at 177.
79. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-600.
80. Id. at 625; see id. at 600-26.
81. See id. at 626-27.
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standard of review-strict or intermediate scrutiny or rationality.12 Both
briefs urged the Court to uphold the D.C. handgun ban on the ground that
it was reasonably related to the government's concern for community
safety." At oral argument, then Solicitor General, Paul Clement, explained
that the Government's brief suggests that "strict scrutiny" not be the
standard of review because the right to keep and bear arms "always
coexisted with reasonable regulations of firearms."" Indeed, General
Clement pointed out that if strict scrutiny were applied to the current
federal firearms statutes, they could not be sustained as promoting a
compelling government interest, but could be defended under the more
relaxed intermediate scrutiny, because such laws would satisfy the test of
reasonable relation to an important government interest."
Forthwith, Chief Justice John Roberts challenged the Solicitor General:
Well, these various phrases under the different standards that are
proposed, "compelling interest," "significant interest," "narrowly
tailored," none of them appear in the Constitution.... 86
And, despite General Clement's plea, none of these tests make an
appearance in the Heller majority decision, but only in Justice Breyer's
dissent.
Five years later-in a petition for writ of certiorari before the Supreme
Court to review a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
that upheld the federal ban on the sale of a handgun by a federally-licensed
firearms dealer to persons under the age of 21-former Solicitor General
Clement, now counsel for the National Rifle Association (NRA) changed
much of his tune. Although still wedded to some kind of balancing test, Mr.
Clement charged:
It has been five years since this Court concluded ... that the
Second Amendment secures an individual right to keep and bear
82. Brief for Petitioner at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No.
07-290) 2008 WL 102223; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) 2008 WL 157201.
83. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 82, at 49; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 82, at 20-21(arguing that "[gliven the unquestionable threat to public safety that
unrestricted private firearm possession would entail, various categories of firearm-related
regulation are permitted by the Second Amendment").
84. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) (No. 07-290).
85. Id. at 43-44.
86. Id. at 44.
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arms .... Given the number of laws enacted by the federal
government ... in the years when a mistaken understanding of
the Second Amendment held sway, one would have expected a
major reconsideration of extant firearms laws to have occurred.
It has not. Instead, jurisdictions have engaged in massive
resistance... and the lower federal courts, long out of the habit
of taking the Second Amendment seriously, have largely
facilitated the resistance.
In a section of the petition entitled "This Court's Intervention Is Needed
To Stem The Tide Of Decisions Applying A Diluted Form Of Scrutiny To
Artificially Cabin The Scope Of The Second Amendment," the NRA
chronicles not only the resistance of the courts below, but courts across-the-
board, highlighting petitioner's concern about the "tide of case law that
strangles the Second Amendment right while purporting to apply a formn of
'heightened scrutiny' to 'protect' it."" The NRA then paraded before the
Court the "watered-down form of 'intermediate'. . . scrutiny" afforded it by
the courts below, forcefully asserting that:
[T]he prevailing methodology has led one commentator to
observe that it is Justice Breyer's dissent in Heller, not Justice
Scalia's majority's opinion, that has become the touchstone of
Second Amendment analysis. As the Heller majority correctly
predicted, that 'interest-balancing' approach has proven so
malleable as to provide 'no constitutional guarantee at all.'
D. Restoring the Rule of Law
The issue is not whether the lower federal courts are applying a watered-
down balancing test, as Mr. Clement now contends. Rather, it is whether
the courts are abiding by the rule of law or displacing the law as revealed in
the text with their own reasoning. In today's world, the rule of law and the
reasoning of judges are assumed to be the same thing. Indeed, Justice
Marshall's statement in Marbury that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" has been construed
by the Supreme Court to conclude that whatever the Court says is law.90
87. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, &
Explosives, 714 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-137).
88. Id. at 26.
89. Id. at 27, 32.
90. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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According to this view, then, the Court's "interpretation" of the law as
"enunciated" in its decisions is the "supreme law of the land."9' Indeed,
according to this view of law, judicial reasoning is the law unless, and until,
the justices change their minds. Under this regime of judicial supremacy,
the only limit upon the exercise of judicial power is judicial self-restraint.
The Constitution, as written, is not the objective standard by which a
judicial opinion is to be measured. Rather, the Court's precedents are
subject only to their own precedents, which, of course, may be overruled.
This modern view of judicial power is wholly inconsistent with the
common understanding of judicial review at the time of the ratification of
the Constitution. John Marshall, along with his other judicial colleagues in
Marbury would have agreed with Sir William Blackstone who wrote in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England that "the law, and the opinion of the
judge are not always convertible terms, or one and the same thing: since it
sometimes may happen that the judge may mistake the law."92 Thus,
according to Blackstone, a court opinion was not law, but only "evidence"
of law." Thus, he concluded, a court opinion, if contrary to law, was not
"bad law;" rather, it was "not law" at all.94
Consistent with this view, Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury justified the
power of the court to rule that a Congressional statute conferring original
jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court was unconstitutional because "the
framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the
government of courts, as well as of the legislature."9 ' So the Chief Justice,
like Judge Samuel before him,9' did not review the legislative vesting of
original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court for "reasonableness" or
"appropriateness," but whether it was consistent with the written text. After
all, the constitution in America, like the one in Israel, was "contemplate [d]
... as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation."" Thus,
Article VI of the Constitution states that "[t]his Constitution"-not this
Constitution as interpreted by Congress, the President, or the Supreme
Court-"shall be the supreme Law of the Land." In like manner,
91. Id.
92. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSONE, COMMENTARIES *71.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803).
96. See supra Part II.C.
97. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
98. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
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Deuteronomy 17:18-20 attests that the law of the kingdom established in
the written document referred to in I Samuel 10:25 bound the king and all
those under him as the law of the land."
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Heller is to the contrary. According
to Breyer's law, the Second Amendment does not constrain the courts or
the legislatures from infringing upon the right of the people to keep and
bear arms unless there is a showing "that the District's regulation is
unreasonable or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms."'c According
to the words of the Second Amendment, the right is vested in the People of
the United States-no exceptions. Yet, Justice Breyer's reasoning upholding
the appropriateness of the handgun ban turned primarily upon his opinion
that "[the law is tailored to the urban crime problem in that it is local in
scope and thus affects only a geographic area both limited in size and
entirely urban" and concerns only hand guns the "overwhelmingly favorite
weapon of armed criminals."'
Suppose that Congress would impose a nationwide ban on handguns,
what then? Would such a statute be unconstitutional as applied to
American citizens living in rural Wyoming, but not as applied to citizens in
Chicago? According to Justice Breyer, the answer appears to be in the
affirmative, the Chicago law "fall]ing within the zone that the Second
Amendment leaves open to regulation by legislatures."'02 Even then, the
circumstances might change-even in Chicago. What then? According to
Justice Breyer, "a court must consider [the facts] looking at the matter as of
today."' While the studies, as reviewed by Justice Breyer, did not indicate
that the danger of firearms in urban environments had changed since the
District of Columbia had banned handguns, that is no guarantee for the
future. Indeed, Justice Breyer acknowledged that a number of studies had
been published since the District had installed its ban but was unpersuaded
that the data had changed enough to persuade him that the empirical data
concerning the competing interests of public safety and self-defense had
changed sufficiently to justify intervention by the Court."
99. See supra Part II.A.
100. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 681 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
101. Id. at 682 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 696.
104. See id. at 701-03.
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This is not Law. This is Sociology 101. A law to be law must be uniform
as to person, universal as to place, and fixed as to time. As Blackstone so
ably argued in his Commentaries, as the "law of nature ... is binding over all
the globe in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any
validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their
force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this
original."'o An American citizen's right to keep and bear arms does not
turn on where he lives-Chicago or Cheyenne, or when he lives-in 1791
or 2013, but upon the such principles as are designed to be permanent as
discovered in the Second Amendment as it is written.
V. THE LAW OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. The Right to Vote Is Not Preservative of All Other Rights
Critics of the Heller and McDonald opinions belittle the stature of the
Second Amendment as outdated and ineffectual.' 6 Ridiculing the notion
that the people's right to keep and bear arms is any match for the military
juggernaut of the United States of America, these critics argue that a semi-
automatic rifle is no match against the nation's arsenal of weapons.'
Additionally, these critics claim that any right to keep and bear arms,
independent from an official state militia, is wholly anathema to the
American system providing for full participation in the election of her
government officials and that this right to vote is sufficient to protect the
people from tyranny.' These critics are seriously mistaken.
To be sure, in 1886, the United States Supreme Court pronounced that
"the political franchise of voting ... is regarded as a fundamental political
105. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41.
106. See, e.g., Edward Corcoran, Forget the Second Amendment, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 25,
2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edward-corcoran/second-amendment-b_2950263.html
(calling the Second Amendment "the single most outdated part of the entire Constitution"); Lee
Gaillard, Public Safety Trumps Outdated, Irrelevant Second Amendment, SEATILE TIMES, Jan. 3,
2008, http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2004104727_gallard03.html (opining that the
"irrelevant Second Amendment should be long gone, too").
107. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Justice Scalia Goes Gun Crazy, THE DAILY BEAST, Aug. 22,
2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/22/justice-scalia-goes-crazy.html. On
more than one occasion, God more than upset the imbalance of power between Israel and
her enemies. See, e.g., Judges 7:1-25. And who would have bet on the early American
minutemen against their adversary, Great Britain?
108. Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law, Policy, and Politics, N.Y. ST. B.J., July/Aug. 2012, at 35,
40.
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right, because [it is] preservative of all rights."'" Yet, as the Court has
conceded, the right to vote is "not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as
a privilege merely conceded by society, according to its will, under certain
conditions.""o Indeed, in the United States Constitution of 1787, there is no
provision guaranteeing to the people a right to vote either for members of
Congress or for the President. With respect to the election of the President,
Article II, Section 1 not only substituted specially designated electors for the
people, but also provided for a system whereby those electors could be
appointed "in such Manner as the Legislature [of each State] may direct,"
and whereby a person could be elected to the presidency without any
popular vote."' With respect to the election to the upper house of Congress,
the members of the Senate were to be selected by the state legislators. Only
the members of the House were to be chosen by the people of the several
States, and, even then, the States were empowered to determine the
qualifications to vote.
Not until the Fifteenth Amendment" 2 was ratified in 1870 did the
Constitution address the right to vote, but it secured that right only against
laws that "denied or abridged [that right] on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."113 The Fifteenth was followed by the
Nineteenth,"' which secured the right to vote from being "denied or
abridged ... on account of sex."" The Nineteenth was followed by the
Twenty-fourth" 6 protecting the right to vote from being denied "by reason
of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.""' Finally, the Twenty-Sixth
109. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370 (1886).
110. Id.
111. U.S.CONsT. art. II, § 1(1787).
112. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1 (1870) ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude[.]").
113. Id.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1 (1920) ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
115. Id.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (1964) ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for
President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay poll tax or other
tax.").
117. Id.
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Amendment"' was designed only to protect the right to vote "on account of
age" of citizens who are eighteen years or older."' In light of this history, the
right to vote has never been constitutionally conferred upon the nation's
citizenry.
B. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Is Preservative of All Other Rights
In contrast with the right to vote, the right to keep and bear arms appears
not only in the 1791 Bill of Rights but is also a pre-existing right.'20 Thus,
the Second Amendment states flat-out that "the right .. . shall not be
infringed." 2' Furthermore, the Second Amendment appears on the heels of
the First, which secures the pre-existing freedoms of religion, speech, press,
assembly, and petition.'22 Not only that, the Second Amendment is
inextricably linked to the preservation of those freedoms, the people's
militia being declared "necessary to the security of a free State."'23
According to Webster's 1828 dictionary, "necessary" means "[t]hat [which]
must be; ... [i]ndispensable; requisite; essential; that cannot be otherwise
without preventing the purpose intended.124 The Second Amendment right
to keep and bear arms, then, is essential to the preservation of the freedoms
of the people, such as those spelled out in the immediately preceding
Amendment and those that follow, as well as any rights included in the
body of the original Constitution.
Unlike the right to vote, which receives limited constitutional protection,
the right to keep and bear arms receives plenary protection, because
America's founders knew from history and experience that an unarmed
people would be defenseless against a tyrant who would deny them their
basic freedoms.125
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (1971) ("The right of citizens of the United States, who
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of age.").
119. Id.
120. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) ("[It has always been widely
understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a
pre-existing right.").
121. U.S. CONST. amend. II, cl. 2.
122. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
123. See U.S. CONST. amend. II, cl. 1.
124. NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Necessary (1828
Online Ed.), available at http://webstersdictionaryl828.com/Home?word=Necessarian.
125. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 597-98.
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C. The Law of the "People"
1. All Members of the American Political Community
As Justice Scalia observed in Heller, "history showed that the way tyrants
had eliminated the militia ... was not by banning the militia but simply by
taking away the people's arms . ... "126 As Justice Scalia initially observed,
"[tihe first salient feature of the operative clause [of the Second
Amendment] is that it codifies a 'right of the people,"' a right that belongs
"to all members of the [American] political community."'27 Unlike the 1689
English Bill of Rights, which limited the right to "have arms for their
defense" to "protestants,"'28 the Second Amendment permits no exceptions.
All American citizens who are numbered among those persons empowered
to constitute and, if necessary, to reconstitute their civil government are
endowed by the Creator with the unalienable right to keep and bear arms.
In direct contradiction of the nation's commitment to the principle of
equality, the D.C. Council in Heller limited the right to possess a handgun
to three favored citizenship classes-D.C. residents who were in possession
of a "validly registered" pistol prior to September 1976, organizations
employing at least one commissioned special police officer, and retired
metropolitan D.C. police officers. 2 9 Because the Second Amendment
secures the right to keep and bear arms, including a handgun to all
members of the D.C. political community, the D.C. handgun ban
unconstitutionally infringed upon the right of the people.
2. Persons Who Are Not Members of the American Polity
Under current federal law there are nine categories of persons who are
declared ineligible to possess a firearm, including a constitutionally
protected handgun.3 0 Only three of the categories are unquestionably
constitutional-a person who is (i) a fugitive from justice; (ii) an alien; or
(iii) "who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his
citizenship.""' No alien, whether illegal, immigrant, or nonimmigrant, nor
126. Id. at 598.
127. Id. at 579-80.
128. ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS para. 25 (1689), available at http://avalon.1aw.yale.edu/
17th_century/england.asp.
129. Brief for Gun Owners Foundation & Gun Owners of America, Inc. as Amici Curiae
at 31, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 405567.
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2), (5), (7).
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anyone who has renounced his citizenship, is part of the American political
community. A fugitive from justice-while he remains in flight-
demonstrates his refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of a State or of the
United States, and by his action has unilaterally declared himself an outlaw
not subject to the jurisdiction of the current government. Unlike the citizen
who renounces his citizenship, however, a fugitive has the power of to
restore his citizenship by submitting himself to the proper civil authorities.
As is true of a fugitive from justice, persons incarcerated upon conviction
of a crime do not enjoy full citizenship rights, having by their conduct put
themselves into a position of servitude. Similarly, persons under a court
order based upon a finding of a continuing credible threat of serious bodily
harm to another person have, by their actions, forfeited their right to keep
and bear arms because they have put themselves under the supervisory
authority of the court. Persons, while duly committed to a mental
institution, would likewise lose their Second Amendment rights while in the
custody of the civil authorities.
3. Persons Who Are Members of the American Polity
While current federal law prohibits a person under the age of twenty-one
from acquiring a firearm from a federally licensed firearms dealer, the law
does not prohibit any child from possessing a firearm.'32 The minor children
(under eighteen years old) of American citizens not yet outside the authority
of their parents or of the civil authorities legitimately exercising power of
parens patriae are not full-fledged members of the polity, lacking the legal
capacity to consent to be governed by the constituted civil authorities. Thus,
such children are under the authority of their parents who have discretion to
decide when and how their children possess and use firearms.
The National Rifle Association has challenged the constitutionality of
this prohibition as applied to an American citizen who is eighteen years old
on the ground that such children have reached the age of maturity and are,
therefore, entitled to the same right of purchase as an adult.133 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has upheld the statute on
public safety grounds.' Dissenting from the appellate court's denial of a
motion for a rehearing en banc, Judge Edith Jones, after review of the
"relevant historical materials," concluded that "they couldn't be clearer: the
132. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1).
133. NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 188 (5th
Cir. 2012) cert. denied 2014 WL 684055 (Feb. 24, 2014).
134. Id. at 203.
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right to keep and bear arms belonged to citizens 18 to 20 years old at the
crucial period of our nation's history."'35 Writ of certiorari in this case was
recently denied by the United States Supreme Court.'"6
More controversial are other categorical denials that have been in place
in the near and distant past, such as felons, illegal drug users and addicts,
those persons adjudicated as "mentally defective" or those who have been
committed to a mental institution, persons who have been dishonorably
discharged from the Armed Forces, and persons convicted of a
misdemeanor of domestic violence. To date no court has ruled that such
categorical denials are unconstitutional. Instead, as is discussed below, it is
commonly assumed that none of these categorical exclusions would violate
the Second Amendment. Upon closer look, it appears that this assumption
is largely based upon the application of Justice Breyer's balancing approach
under which each category could be justified as a measure designed to
protect public safety and, therefore, a constitutionally reasonable
regulation.' Properly analyzed, however, each of the five categories may
very well be constitutionally illegitimate.
a. Felons
With respect to the ban on felon possession, Justice Scalia wrote in Heller
that "nothing in [the Court's] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.""' At the
same time, Justice Scalia stated that such a law was only one of several
"presumptively lawful regulatory measures.""' Unlike the fugitive from
justice and the renounced citizen, a felon has not voluntarily severed his
connection to the political community. True, while incarcerated a felon
forfeits many of his constitutional rights to the overarching disciplinary
needs of prison life, that is justified on the grounds that the Government, as
proprietor, has authority to "control behavior on its property." 40
135. NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 714 F.3d 334, 336-44
(5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam denying rehearing en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting).
136. See 2014 WL 684055 (Feb. 24, 2014).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2010) (denying the
right to possess arms where recidivism rate and risk outweighed the right to possess firearms
after convictions for misdemeanor domestic abuse).
138. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,626 (2008).
139. Id. at 627 n.26.
140. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1443, 1447
(2009).
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Historically, it could be argued that felony firearms disqualification can
be constitutionally justified by the English common law of "civil death,"
under which a person who committed a felony lost "all civil rights,"
including the right to own property or to engage in any other legal function
because he was "regarded as dead by the law."' Even in England the
doctrine of civil death was used sparingly, reserving it for a criminal who is
"no longer fit to live upon the earth, but is to be exterminated as a monster
and a bane to human society." 4 2 Under this view, a citizen who is found
guilty of a felony would no longer be counted as a member of the political
community and, therefore, not part of the "people" of the United States.
But the felony disqualification in current federal law does not extend to
citizens who have been convicted of certain business crimes.4 4 Nor is the
current felony disqualification limited to those citizens convicted of a crime
of violence.'" Furthermore, "[c]ivil death and the other incidents of
attainder were never a part of the common law recognized in the United
States, and in the absence of statute, courts have refused to recognize them
as an incident of conviction." 45
To be sure, felons have been disenfranchised in America, and, even
though such disenfranchisement can be traced back to the English
"tradition of civil death," it appears to have a life of its own separate and
apart.'" While felons have been disenfranchised in America, they have not
been deprived of any other rights, such as those under the First
Amendment. And as noted above, access to the vote has never been
considered an essential attribute to full participation in the political
community, and, thus, cannot serve as a precedent for denial of the right to
keep and bear arms.
If felons cannot be disqualified, then it would logically follow that neither
can a citizen who has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces.
Such a discharge can be imposed only by general court martial and upon
141. See Harry David Saunders, Civil Death -A New Look at an Ancient Doctrine, 11 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 988, 988-89 (1970).
142. 4 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380.
143. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
144. See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J. OF LAW
& PUB. POL. 695, 699, 706-07 (2009) (noting that, prior to 1961, there was a federal ban on
felony possession, but it was "limited to those convicted of a 'crime of violence').
145. Volokh, supra note 140, at 990.
146. See Sarah C. Grady, Comment, Civil Death is Different: An Examination of a Post-
Graham Challenge to Felon Disenfranchisement under the Eighth Amendment, 102 J. OF CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 441,443-47 (2012).
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conviction of a serious violation of the Uniform Code of Military
tantamount to a felony. The only difference would be that the citizen
committed the crime while serving in the American armed forces and that
the penalty imposed reflects a decision that the actions of the service
member were inimical to the reputation of the armed forces. One might
argue that such action was not only a crime but also a betrayal of loyalty
arising from the special disciplinary relationship between the citizen and
the government.
b. Misdemeanants
Even if felons could be disqualified on the ground that they are "civilly
dead," there is absolutely no support for applying that ancient doctrine to
misdemeanants. Nor is there any independent support for any
disqualification from exercising the right to keep and bear arms on the
ground that commission of misdemeanor, even one involving force,
provides a sufficient basis for exclusion of the miscreant from the political
community. Quite the contrary, as Blackstone documents in his
Commentaries, while misdemeanors are synonymous with crimes, "in
common usage, the word 'crimes' is made to denote such offences as are of
a deeper and more atrocious dye; while smaller faults, and omissions of less
consequence, are comprized under the gentler name of 'misdemeanors'
only."'47
The Second Amendment properly applied, then, would be violated by a
rule disqualifying citizens who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence, as prescribed by 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9),14s
popularly known as the Lautenberg Amendment. However, eschewing
Heller's categorical test, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit en banc resorted to a modest interest balancing test"4 based on
general social science studies of domestic violence to uphold the
constitutionality of an absolute ban based upon a "belief... that people who
have been convicted of violence once-toward a spouse, child, or domestic
147. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) ("It shall be unlawful for any person ... who has been
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or transport in
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.").
149. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer's Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 703, 745-46 (2012).
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partner, no less-are likely to use violence again."so As dissenting judge
Sykes pointed out, the court did not even insist that the government make its
case, but rather "supplied" the empirical studies and data-"an odd way to
put the government to its burden of justifying a law that prohibits the exercise
of a constitutional right.""' Skoien is, thus, an example of rule by judges, par
excellence, not worthy of an American court committed to the rule of law.
c. The mentally ill
An even greater threat posed to the rule of law is the popular
assumption that it is constitutional to keep firearms out of the hands of
the mentally ill, as many have inferred from Justice Scalia's gratuitous
statement in Heller that "nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on the longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
... the mentally ill."l 52 In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit accurately observed, after Heller, that "section 922(g)(4) [of
Title 18, United States Code,] does not bar firearms possession for those
who are or were mentally ill and dangerous, but (pertinently) only for any
person 'who has been adjudicated as a mental defective' or 'has been
committed to a mental institution." 53 Even before Heller, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled in United States v.
Hansel'54 that a State Board of Mental Health finding that a defendant was
"mentally ill and in need of hospitalization" did not constitute an
adjudication that the defendant was a "mental defective.""' After a careful
review of the relevant medical and legal literature, the court acknowledged
that there is "a distinction . . . between those persons who are mentally
defective or deficient on the one hand, and those who are mentally
diseased or ill on the other.""' A mental defective, the Court concluded,
designates a person "of subnormal intelligence," one who is
"feebleminded," and in "'varying degrees of the descending scale of
moronity, imbecility and idiocy.""5 If a person fits this definition, then a
person adjudicated as mental defective could perhaps be excluded from
150. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (2010).
151. Id. at 646-47 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
152. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
153. Rehlander v. United States, 666 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2012).
154. United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir. 1973).
155. Id. at 1123.
156. Id. at 1124.
157. Id. (quoting People v. Hoffmann, 8 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (App. Div. 1938)).
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the "people" on much the ground of a lack of capacity to consent, like a
person under the age of eighteen, and not suited to serve in the people's
militia.
If, however, a "mental defective" is construed more broadly-to extend
to a person who has been "adjudicated" mentally ill or committed to a
mental institution, there is a strong argument that such persons cannot
constitutionally be excluded from the "people," in light of the well-
document twentieth century political abuse of psychiatry in the former
Soviet Union and other communist countries.'s
While some would dismiss such concerns as farfetched, there are already
such rumblings on the Internet. In a December 26, 2012 article in the
Huffington Post, Mark Olmsted penned these words:
There is nothing about NRA-crazy we dare dismiss. It's a deep
crazy. It is the craziness of millions of gun-owners who have
convinced themselves ... that wielding an instrument of
mayhem is spiritually elevated rather than spiritually bankrupt.
It's the craziness of confusing the Second Amendment with the
Lord's prayer. It's the craziness which tells you the symptoms of
your disease as your cure.'
As famed psychiatrist, the late Thomas Szasz observed, the danger of an
alliance between civil government and mental illness is similar to the danger
of an alliance between civil government and religious faith: Both open the
door to government tyranny in the form of a therapeutic state empowered
to ensure right thinking.160
d. Drug users
In a recent report by Mayors Against Illegal Guns, gun control advocates
lamented the fact that the National Instant Criminal Background Check
(NICS) has utterly failed to keep firearms out of the hands of the mentally
158. See Robert van Voren, Political Abuse of Psychiatry - An Historical Overview,
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN, available at http://www.ncbi.nIm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC2800147/.
159. Mark Olmsted, The Deep Crazy of the NRA, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 26, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-olmsted/the-deep-crazy-of-the-nra b_2357428.html.
160. See CCHR Co-Founder D. Thomas Szasz Professor of Psychiatry Emeritus, CCHR
International: The Mental Health Watchdog, http:www.cchrint.org/about-us/co-founder-dr-
thomas-szasz/quotes.hmtl (last visited Jan. 4, 2014) (presenting Dr. Szasz's thoughts on the
dangers of government-psychiatry alliance).
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ill and drug addicts.'6 ' Why? Because there are no official government
records kept on persons who are mentally ill or addicted to drugs. Indeed,
the Mayors report found that "Forty-four states have submitted fewer than
10 records, and 33 of those haven't turned in any."162 Such erratic record
keeping is strong testimony that Congress is not really serious about
keeping firearms out of the hands of drug users.
Additionally, it appears that the drug use disqualification illegitimately
discriminates in favor of citizens whose addiction is to FDA-approved
pharmaceuticals and against those citizens whose addiction is to "controlled
substances," as defined by federal law. Yet the National Institute on Drug
Abuse has reported recently that the misuse of pain relievers, tranquilizers,
stimulants, and sedatives pose a serious problem among young adults.16
Furthermore, with the changes in state law governing marijuana use, the
line drawn by the federal law between cannabis, a firearm disqualifier, and
alcohol use, is becoming increasingly problematic.
4. Can the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Be Forfeited?
In an Amicus Brief submitted on behalf of Gun Owners of America
(GOA) and Gun Owners Foundation (GOF) in the Seventh Circuit appeal
in United States v. Skoien, important questions were posed:
If a citizen may be deprived of his Second Amendment right as a
consequence of having been convicted of a M[isdemeanor]C[rime
ofi D[omestic]V[iolence], what principle would prevent the
government from similarly abridging First Amendment rights as
well? Could the government, for example, deprive a citizen of his
freedom to engage in peaceable assembly on the ground that he had
been previously convicted of disorderly conduct in relation to a
public protest against an abortion clinic which, in Congress's
predictive judgment, created serious dangers to the public peace and
a woman's right to choose?'"
161. See Michael McAuliff Gun-Check System Misses Millions of Drug Abusers, People with
Mental Illness, New Report Finds, HUFFINGTON Posr, Nov. 14, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpostcom/2011/11/14/gun-check-system-misses millions_n_1093899.html.
162. Id.
163. See Topics in Brief Prescription Drug Abuse, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE
(Revised Dec. 2011), http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/topics-in-brief/prescription-
drug-abuse.
164. Brief for Gun Owners Foundation & Gun Owners of America, Inc. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants and Reversal at 14, United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (2010) (No.
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The very idea that an American citizen could be denied his First
Amendment rights on the ground that, in the past, he committed a felony
or serious misdemeanor is antithetical to the principle of popular
sovereignty. In a nation where the government serves the people-not the
other way around, the government cannot forcibly divest a citizen of his
citizenship. 6 1 If Congress may not take away an American's citizenship,
then it cannot deny to any citizen any right that is inherent in citizenship.
Thus, as a convicted felon may not constitutionally be denied the freedoms
of religion, speech, press, and assembly, neither can he, on account of his
felony conviction, be denied his right to keep and bear arms. That right,
along with the others that are inherent in one's citizenship, can only be
forfeited by a voluntary act renouncing one's citizenship.'"
C. The Law of Keeping and Bearing Arms
1. Balancing the Interests Revisited
In Moore v. Madigan,'67 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit addressed the question whether an Illinois statute that, with
few exceptions, prohibited a person from carrying a ready-to-use firearm
outside one's home or place of business was unconstitutional under the
Second Amendment. 6 1 In a rare judicial act of conforming his inquiry to
Heller's textual analysis, Judge Richard Posner began with the proposition
that:
The right to "bear" as distinct from the right to "keep" arms is
unlikely to refer to the home. To speak of "bearing" arms within
one's home would at all times have been an awkward usage. A
right to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun
outside the home. 69
To this textual beginning, Judge Posner added an historical excursion
starting with early America and Blackstone's England, concluding that the
08-3770), 2010 WL 2665129.
165. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) ("[W]e reject the idea ... [that]
Congress has any general power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen's
citizenship without his assent.").
166. See id. at 262.
167. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
168. Id. at 934.
169. Id. at 936.
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need of arms for self-defense in areas away from home at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights had not changed in "[t]wenty-first century
Illinois [which] has no hostile Indians[,] [b]ut a Chicagoan is a good deal
more likely to be attacked on a sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than in
his apartment on the 35th floor of the Park Tower." 70
Judge Posner should have ended his opinion right there, but he could not
refrain from reviewing "the empirical literature on the effects of allowing
carriage of guns in public."'7 ' He did, however, manage to do what very few
of his appellate colleagues have been able to do-he refused to be
persuaded by the social scientific data one way or the other.172 But he
declined on what appears to be "pragmatic" grounds, not principle. 7 1
One year earlier, D.C. Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh offered another
rare principled opinion; this one in dissent from his appellate colleague's
ruling that the constitutionality of the D.C. gun control law enacted post-
Heller was to be tested by "intermediate scrutiny:"' 4
Put in simple terms, the issue with respect to what test to apply
to gun bans and regulations is this: Are gun bans and regulations
to be analyzed based on the Second Amendment's text, history,
and tradition (as well as by appropriate analogues thereto when
dealing with modern weapons and new circumstances . .. )? Or
may judges re-calibrate the scope of the Second Amendment
right based on judicial assessment of whether the law advances a
sufficiently compelling or important government interest to
override the individual rights?7 1
Judge Kavanaugh answered his own question, rehearsing Justice Scalia's
Heller opinion in which he specifically denounces the judicial habit of
assessing the "usefulness" of the Second Amendment guarantee."'
170. Id. at 937.
171. Id. at 939.
172. See id. at 939-42.
173. Id. at 939 ("In sum, the empirical literature on the effects of allowing the carriage of
guns in public fails to establish a pragmatic defense of the Illinois law.").
174. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1271.
176. See id. at 1277.
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So the constitutional questions concerning the possession and use of
arms and the types of arms, like the question of individual entitlement to
the right to keep and bear arms, is subject to text, context, and history.
2. The Original Purpose of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
No doubt Judge Posner was correct to conclude that the right to "bear"
arms adds to the right to "keep," and that the term "bear" includes carry in
public places as well as from room to room. But Judge Posner neglected
putting "bear" in a fulsome Second Amendment context. According to
Judge Posner, the American right to keep and bear arms was designed "for
personal self-defense" against "hostile Indians.""' In fact, as Justice Scalia
observed, the express terms of the Second Amendment settles its purpose,
and it is not Judge Posner's:
The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its
prefatory clause and its operative clause. The former does not
limit the latter grammatically, but rather announces a purpose.
The Amendment could be rephrased, "Because a well regulated
Militia is necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed."'
Therefore, Justice Scalia reasoned, because "[1] ogic demands that there be
a link between the stated purpose and the command," we must "ensure that
our reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced
purpose.""' Thus, after determining that the operative clause "guarantee[s]
the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation," 0 Justice Scalia checked to see whether that determination
was consistent with the Second Amendment's purpose, namely, to prevent
the elimination of a citizen's militia which was deemed to be necessary to
secure a free civil order.' He found that an armed citizenry for "self-
defense and hunting" suited that purpose because it ensured a well-trained
body of citizens independent and apart from a state-organized militia and,
thus, as a "safeguard against tyranny."182
177. Moore, 702 F.3d at 936.
178. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
179. id. at 577-78.
180. Id. at 592.
181. Id. at 598.
182. Id. at 600.
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Thus, the Heller Court posited that to be a constitutionally protected
arm, a weapon must not only be one that a person may "bear," or carry,
but one that is "'in common use,' not one that is "'dangerous and
unusual.""" Any weapon that is suitable self-defense or hunting would
clearly qualify.184 So would so-called "assault weapons" and "large-capacity
magazines," both of which are commonly possessed.' Such weaponry is
well within capability of use by the ordinary citizen and, therefore, suited to
use in a self-governing citizen's militia composed of self-disciplined and
familiarly-trained-in-arms persons.'"'
It would be mistake, however, to assume that the weaponry protected by
the Second Amendment is limited to those arms in common use today.
Rather, as the Oregon Supreme Court has observed:
[T]he term "arms" as used by the drafters of the constitutions
probably was intended to include those weapons used by settlers
for both personal and military defense."'
While this interpretive standard would not embrace military weapons
"never ... intended for personal possession and protection," but only for
exclusive use by the military, it would not exclude from Second
183. Id. at 626-27.
184. Id. at 628-29.
185. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1260-61 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
186. That a person well trained in arms for hunting is ready to engage in a war against
tyrants is exemplified by an account written by Stephen Ambrose in his book on World War
II, Citizen Soldiers, of one Lieutenant Waverly Way:
He was from Batesville, Mississippi, and was an avid woodsman, skilled with
rifles and shotguns. He claimed he had never missed a shot in his life....
... He was going to do a one-man reconnaissance to formulate a plan of
attack. Wray was going out into the unknown....
Wray moved up sunken lanes, crossed an orchard, pushed his way through
hedgerows, crawled through a ditch. Along the way he noted concentrations of
Germans, in field and lanes. A man without his woodsman's sense of direction
would have gotten lost.
The N-13 was the axis of the German attack. Wray "moving like the deer
stalker he was"... got to a place where he would hear guttural voices ... Wray
rose up ... swung his M-1 to a ready position [and shot 10 Germans dead] with
one shot each.
STEPHEN AMBROSE, CITIZEN SOLDIERS 18-20 (1997).
187. Oregon v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 99 (Or. 1980).
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Amendment protection the "modern day equivalents of the weapons used
by colonial militiamen."'" Thus, any modern weapon that is a lineal
descendent of the "ordinary military equipment [the use of which] could
contribute to the common defense," should be constitutionally protected.'
Once a firearm or other weapon is determined to be a constitutionally
protected arm, then the "keeping" and "bearing" of that arm is free from all
civil limitations, restrictions, and burdens, including registration, permits,
training, concealed carry, open carry, and other similar usages. However,
applying the interest balancing methodology employed by the dissenters in
Heller, lower federal courts are generally sustaining the constitutionality of
such laws.o Without any discussion whether such laws square with the
purpose of protecting the right of the people to a citizen's militia free from
regulation by the state, the court of appeals in Heller II begins with the
presumption that general registration requirements are constitutional
because they are "long-standing," dating back to the beginning of the
twentieth century.'9 ' Hence, the Heller II Court wrongfully assumed that
only "novel registration requirements" are potentially unconstitutional.'92
Courts generally have also assumed that laws prohibiting the carrying of
a lawful firearm in public are presumptively constitutional, the only
question being whether the Second Amendment requires that such a permit
must be granted, or whether such permit may be withheld unless the person
seeking the permit has shown "'good' and 'substantial' reason," such as "a
special need for self-defense distinguishable from that of the population at
large, often through a specific and particularized threat of harm."' 93 In
essence, such laws presume that the core Second Amendment right is self-
defense inside the home in disregard of the core purpose of a citizen's
militia.'94 Such an assumption is doubtless inconsistent with the right of
sovereign people to make their own decision whether they needed to carry
188. Id.
189. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). Justice Scalia's opinion in
Heller is to the contrary, having mistakenly narrowed Miller to include only weapons suitable
for self-defense, and thereby, having created an unnecessary dissonance between the
Amendment's operative and prefatory clauses, apparently to foreclose any claim that the
Second Amendment might extend beyond semi-automatic firearms to machine guns. See
Heller, 554 U.S. at 624-28.
190. See, e.g., Heller II at 1248-55.
191. See id. at 1253-55.
192. See id. at 1255-60.
193. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 442 (3d Cir. 2013).
194. See, e.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874 (2013).
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their weapon at the ready in public, should the need arise. A sovereign
people is primarily self-governed and mutually bound as a community, not
lorded-over by their civil servants.'
Additionally, the manufacture and marketing of constitutionally
protected arms must be free from any targeted licensure, the access to arms
implicit in the right to keep and to bear them.'96 Any such infringements
would compromise the very notion of a "well-regulated" militia, that is, a
militia of self-governed, able-bodied, well-armed citizens duty-bound to
fight for freedom, armed with weapons acquired and readied for use by
their own means, and under their own sovereign authority, completely out
from under the civil authorities, federal or state. Otherwise, how could the
people's militia described in the Second Amendment be necessary "to the
security of a free state," the first principle of which is the continuing civil
sovereignty of the people?"'
3. The Right Presupposes a Moral and Religious People
Modern gun control advocates would perceive such an unregulated
regime as anarchy, not freedom. Indeed, they contend that it is the utmost
folly to rely on individual or community self-government as a check on
"gun violence." Rather, in their opinion anything short of an all-
encompassing civil government-control of firearm would be the functional
equivalent of a lawless world.' According to their world-view, if civil
195. See Matthew 20:25.
196. See Illinois Ass'n. of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, No. 10C 04184, 2014 WL
31339 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2014) ("[Just as the gun-range ban [unconstitutionally] prevented
Chicagoans from meeting a Chicago Firearms Permit prerequisite of legal gun ownership,
the ban on gun sales and transfers prevents Chicagoans from fulfilling, within the limits of
Chicago, the most fundamental prerequisite of legal gun ownership - that of simple
acquisition.").
197. See Edward J. Erler, The Second Amendment as an Expression of First Principles, 42
IMPRIMUS No. 3, 2-5 (2013); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595-600
(2008).
198. See, e.g., Editorial, The Virginia Tech Betrayal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/opinion/08sun3.html?_r=0 ("Richmond [Virginia]
lawmakers have callously rejected a gun control proposal sought as a memorial to the 32
students slain in the Virginia Tech massacre. Once more, state senators proved more
beholden to the gun lobby's propaganda and campaign money than to public safety....
Bereft of courage as public servants, the Richmond senators made clear their crocodile tears
about "closure," shed in the immediate horror of students gunned down. They also made
clear the need for a federal law to bypass cowardly statehouses and to close gun-show
loopholes.").
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government force is not employed, then there are no restraints upon human
behavior, constrained as mankind is only by the genes and the
environment.
Such was decidedly not the worldview of America's founders, the
architects of the Second Amendment. As John Adams observed: "Our
Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly
inadequate to the government of any other."' From before the founding of
the United States of America, the American legal order was explicitly
founded upon Christian principles. As Justice Joseph Story proclaimed in
his inaugural address as the first Dane Professor of Law at Harvard:
One of the beautiful boasts of our municipal jurisprudence is,
that Christianity is a part of the common law, from which it
seeks the sanction of its rights, and by which it endeavours to
regulate its doctrines.... There never has been a period, in
which the Common Law did not recognize Christianity as lying
at its foundations.200
One of those first founding principles featured in the common law of torts
and crimes is the Christian view that man, created in the image of God, is
not determined by his genes or environment. Rather, as Jesus taught:
There is nothing from without a man, that entering into him can
defile him: but the things which come out of him, those are they that
defile the man.. . .Are ye so without understanding also? Do ye not
perceive that whatsoever thing from without entereth into the man,
it cannot defile him; [b]ecause it entereth not into his heart, but into
the belly.... For from within, out of the heart of men proceed evil
thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders .... 2 1
Applied to the twenty-first century, this teaching affirms that guns don't
kill people; people kill people. Ours, however, is an evolutionary age. Our
culture has become increasingly relativistic and situational. Nowhere is this
199. Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of
the Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL LIFE OF
GENERAL WILLIAM HULL 265, 266 (Maria Campbell ed., 1848), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=E2kFAAAAQAAJ&dq=editions%3AVsZcW99fWPgC&p
g=PA265#v=onepage&q&f=false.
200. Joseph Story, Discourse Pronounced upon the Inauguration of the Author, as Dane
Professor of Law in Harvard University, Aug. 25th, 1829, reprinted in LEGAL MIND IN
AMERICA 178 (P. Miller ed., 1962).
201. Mark 7:15, 18-20 (King James).
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more evident than in the national outcry of politicians, professors,
psychiatrists, and other professionals for more and more gun control in the
aftermath of the last mass shooting by a madman, allegedly addicted to
violent video games, behavior-altering drugs, or some other social or
psychological malady.
4. The Right Precludes Preventive Measures
In a revealing concurring opinion upholding a National Park ban on
loaded handguns, Fourth Circuit Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III "eloquently
and candidly"202 excused the court's refusal to extend Heller I outside the
home, stating: "We do not wish to be even minutely responsible for some
unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in the peace of our judicial
chambers we miscalculated as to Second Amendment rights."203
Unwittingly, Judge Wilkinson revealed why gun control laws undermine
the constitutional foundation upon which the right to keep and bear arms
rests. No right designed to protect the people from tyranny can possibly be
secured against any law that is designed to prevent firearm violence, if the
constitutionality of that law is determined by the predictive judgments of
any civil authority-legislative, executive, or judicial. As Judge Wilkinson's
statement reveals, those in power need only fear those "mistaken" decisions
favoring firearm freedoms, which are bound to be revealed, not those
erroneous decisions denying access to a firearm that will never be found
out.
Despite this built-in bias against firearm freedoms, modern day civil
authorities take advantage of their apparent monopoly on force to control
firearm possession and use without asking the question whether civil
authorities have jurisdiction to punish today on the ground of what a
person might do tomorrow. Such a regime of "preventive justice" is wrong
on two grounds. It is based upon the erroneous presumption that man can
know the future when, in fact, he knows not even what tomorrow will
bring, except for that which God chooses to reveal to him.2" And it is based
upon the further mistaken assumption that if man does not use the force of
civil government to prevent future harm, there is no alternative effective
force to protect the public from harm by the misuse of firearms.205 However,
in a legal and political order based upon Biblical principles, we know that
202. Rostron, supra note 149, at 758.
203. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458,475 (4th Cir. 2011).
204. See James 4:13-15.
205. But see, e.g., Genesis 20:6.
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God not only has the authority, but the power to prevent individual
wrongdoing before it happens.206
VI. CONCLUSION
As Chief Justice Roberts indicated at oral argument in Heller, there is no
good reason for the Second Amendment to pick up the "sort of baggage" of
interest balancing and judicial reasoning that the courts have saddled upon
the First Amendment.207 After a decent start in Heller and McDonald to
establish a rule of law based upon the written text of the Second
Amendment, the Heller majority opinion is in danger of being overrun by
lower courts that, out of habit or prejudice or both, are substituting their
evolving reasoning for the fixed principles. To date, the Court has declined
review of any Second Amendment claim on the merits, looking for the best
possible case for elaborating and solidifying the textual principles embraced
in Heller. At stake is whether the right to keep and bear arms will be
governed by the rule of law, or will revert to rule by judges.
206. See, e.g., id.
207. Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 44.
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